No. 61

The problem of being within a merely relative sensuous world .

<Finite determinability of the things within the practice of life – determinability *in infinitum* of the things of purely objective theoretical interest. The definitive truth of a subject-matter as practical idea>[[1]](#footnote-1)

*<Content:> The world of experiences in purely objective (theoretical) attitude as a pure world of objects. First draft of the idea of a philosophy as a theoretical science of this pure subject-matter, related to the relativism cognized as being infinite. Ideal of a science in the firm method of approximation.*

1) That which we usually call “external experience”, “sensuous experience” is a perceiving meaning, believing, is an experiential judgment, which declares itself within the perceptional statement. Derived therefrom: memorial judgments, expectational judgments, anticipating experiential opinions verifying or confuting themselves through perceptional and memorial judgments. External perception is believe in existence, believe in existing things of this or that content (of the dispositional content, of the being-thus). And external perception in the process – that is, of another direction and connection, continuous and discrete, of perceptions of the same – is confirmation or else correction, whereby the supposed same now shows these, now those new properties, but also determines more closely that which has already come to cognizance, but possibly determines in another way in an assimilating correction. In each perception fore-seizing anticipations are implied, determined or more or less undetermined ones, then simply determining themselves in further experience. But also the determined ones are still relatively undetermined, they leave open further, more closer determination.

It can be seen: that experience is always merely doxa, this needs a more distinct analysis; and it needs to be pointed out that every such **[695]** doxa is a pretention of a possession, of a self-grip of the supposed thing, which at the same time is a fore-seizing. Within the – literally spoken – gripping experience of an object, like when I take hold of a book (for example in the darkness), and have taken hold of, I have the mental process of having a hold of this itself. But at the same time that which I have a hold of, is only something partially having been self-seized. **The grip is at the same time a fore-seizing**; “I can” proceed in a self-seizing way, and step by step seize in ever new grips within the consciousness of the same, encompass the whole book, whereby each grip is a partial grip and at the same time anticipation, pre-intention, pointing to further grips which I “could” gain in an active way. But considered closely, each perception – also such a supposedly all-round grip – is still an anticipation. I have always the thing itself <within a> perception, and always still with a horizon of what is still to be grasped.

2) There was still another question in advance: **No statement being based upon perception**[[2]](#footnote-2) - however it gathers and combines within the synthesis of the experiencing statements that which after elimination of the “wrong”, that is of that which has been given up after correction, emerges as univocally truly being thus – **results in a complete answer to the question as to what the respective being is**. **Or else**: Each perceptional statement implies the sense: “This my perceptional object is qualitied thus and thus according to my experience, according to my univocal experience, that which is still continuously-univocally proceeding and according to the former one, whether being univocal in an unbroken way or having been brought to univocality through correction.” Since each synthetic univocal experience leaves open a closer determination, that is, with regard to the already self-grasped properties as well as with regard to [properties] which have not yet been grasped, and still are fore-meant in indeterminacy, thus the object is in no experience already actually and in the “true”, complete sense self-given.[[3]](#footnote-3) The self-giving of the current experience de facto is self-anticipation, which depends on further experience. And within this self-anticipation the anticipation of a progress in the grade of self-presentation is implied. Ever more, ever more increased one gains the self, but each increasing of the self is simply an **[696]** increasing of the self-presentation; and the self-presentation is always distant from the self, there is always an open horizon for further increases. But does not each experience leave open the possibility of a correction referring back, especially by way of the possibly never to be eliminated possibility that future experience not only more closely but also differently determines and thereby corrects the complete previous experience by referring back?

3) But also the problem of the experiential possibility of the material change becomes important here.[[4]](#footnote-4) If I turn in an experiencing way from the front of a thing to its anticipated back – and now the front becomes the back and vice versa -, how can I say “I experience what the thing is like, that is, what it is like in its own duration”? When I get to the back – that is, within the experiential believe it was a “resting” thing -, then I experience the properties of the back at a later point of time, than that which I meant when anticipating (since I formerly meant the thing which is now thus and thus, and among that, the way it is now on the back); when returning <I experience> the front at a later point of time, than I formerly experienced it. It could have changed during non-regarding. Can I experience this, that it has not changed? Do I not even in direct “perception of changes” often need to cognize afterwards, that the object remained unchanged? Thus when I see a movement but do not know that I am being moved. Even if I accept continuous experience as good evidence for rest and change (that is, [if] I would approve an own kind of legitimation for such things to it), I do not on the other side need to concede that I indeed, in the case of discrete synthesis of experiences, whereby the former ones are represented by however favorable and clear recollections, had to convince myself that the thing had changed in the meantime, and had then again taken its old peculiarity?

To this is added the “experience” of the dependency of the things’ changes and of the experienced changes of the organism and the intellect. Anyway: **no experience** – continuous and linked in a discrete-synthetic way, which, related to the same **[697]** thing, is consciousness of the same “it itself” determining itself according to being, being thus, unchanged and changed being-thus – **is actual self-giving**. I never gain a “definite” self, I never gain and I am never able to gain an experiential conviction, and a statement expressing it which could be accepted by me once and for all, to which I could safely stick as my definite conviction it was this and that and it was of this disposition, it was something resting in such a way, thus movable, resting thus unchanged, thus changing, thus working, thus effected. Each “truth” is – simply when it is a pure experiential truth, pure expression of suchlike which had been and is given in actually experiencing grasping “itself” – mere pretention and is disposed for further possible experiences, which, however they may verify my doxa, still leave open that I had to modify or possibly abandon them completely.[[5]](#footnote-5) But all that then is valid at the same time for the single subject and its experiences and for the intersubjectivity.

Although the experience implies, the somehow always unified totality of the single subject’s streaming experiences and of the human community communicating with each other, the **consciousness of a being world** with the being things of the respective experience within the state of univocality of this experience, which ever again reproduces itself through all corrections. Being things are supposedly self-given with being properties, relations, being as being changed or unchanged, causally having an effect on each other, dependent on each other in their changes. And all the given world is itself an experiential extract of a not given, but experienceable [world] within its self-being. Thus the “idea” of a being world and of a world truth being related to it, is always present and no less a practically established world. Even a practical final validity and truth is always counted on.[[6]](#footnote-6)

We have in continuous experiential possession – as unity within the self-giving perception, the self-reproducing recollection, the expectancy pre-directed towards the self and verifying itself, <within> the mutual communication with others and the thereby mediated connection of one’s own and foreign experience – being things in the objective unity of a being world.[[7]](#footnote-7) **The things are not unattainable in life’s practice**, do not as ideas lie within infinity. The practice makes the infinities finite; it lives in the direction of the goals of desire and will, and it lives within the stream of the experience verifying itself, as long trusting its anticipations as they do not quarrel with each other, <as> the experiential believe remains an “unquestioned” uninhibited certainty, instead of taking over the form of the experiential doubt in an inhibited way, [the form] of the mere questionable supposition, of the negation, etc. Here the respective experienced thing is not undetermined into infinity, and demanding determination. The objective is completely given, if it is given in such a way that the experiencing self fulfills the valuing and practical intentions and by way of the unbroken certainty of the experience is able to any time fulfill it <and> is at any time at one’s disposition within this self – according to a clear and satisfying, unquestionable subjective certainty. **The doxic goal of fulfillment lies within he finite, since the axiological-practical does**.

Certainly, the practical interest changes within life and the thing is still the same – it is experienced as the same within this change. There is thus also a unitary experience, reaching beyond this change; and only thereby is the world itself the general being, to which all our interests relate, and substrate of all subjective grasping as apperceptions being determined by the interest.[[8]](#footnote-8) The coin is not just a coin, it is also an aesthetical object, the chemist’s and physician’s, etc. piece of material; It is itself – as **something identical** – at the basis. But in this synthesis of changing axiologically-practically limited experience, the identical has not itself become the goal-idea;[[9]](#footnote-9) therefore a proper **[699]** interest is needed, surpassing these relativities. This means: A proper **interest** is needed **for the pure „objective“**,[[10]](#footnote-10) for that <which> goes through all actual and still possible value-apperceptions as preliminary, and [which is] thereby something identical in the “abstraction” of all valuations.[[11]](#footnote-11) “Abstraction” thus means at this point for the fact, for the possibility of the object as object of any interest and being interested: <I> therefore have to treat <it> in this regard as something freely variable, and need to be exclusively interested in the “value-free” substrate of all possible special valuations, - which I simply presuppose for all valuations.[[12]](#footnote-12)

This **“theoretical” interest**, more clearly: the **purely objective** one, is a trait of aiming, is valuing and practical intention towards the objectivity of possible valuation itself and abstraction of all valuing, <is the interest> which is itself still unfulfilled in all fulfillment. This interest would completely be acted out in the free traverse of all those infinities of experiential syntheses, in which all being undetermined would determine itself, that being incompletely <determined> would determine itself more closely, and would determine itself ever more closely, in which all corrections are performed, all discrepancies ever again are remedied, and then ever again the process of the experiencing cognizance and self-determination would happen – but thus *in infinitum*, encompassing the whole world. Each thing already for itself, namely for the infinity of the causal linkage, demands the performance of the same infinity of experiences, - which as such can never become actual practice. Thus the purely objective interest is directed towards an ideal pole as correlate of a concept of the freely possible continuation of univocal experience being performed as an “*in infinitum*”, respectively de facto interrupting within the **[700]** mode of the “and so on” belonging to each concept of infinity. This **idea of the objective actuality** (the actuality of the things themselves, of men and animals themselves, of the world itself as unity of pure objectivity) shows itself as **being accepted**; it is in its formation equivalent to the experiential actuality itself, it is the extracted sense of this certainty, which indeed, as continuously anticipating, implies the certainty that continuous experience will constantly take on the form of univocal verification and grasping of a consistent self and also within the change of all random and delimiting interests of the mood.[[13]](#footnote-13) Simply thereby a **pure objective truth, directed towards infinity** – in which, if it was attainable, a **finality** was implied – is distinguished from the random, empirical truth, the relative one of the limited univocalities and verifications. But this final objective truth is in the same way an **idea**, like the object in itself is an idea.

To perform such clarifications, and in progressive differentiated shapes, is itself a fundamental desiderate for a beginning philosophy – but which was in no way enabled for this. From there the further task accrues to produce a **practical** idea <out of> a final objective truth. In how far is the naïve cognitional goal of an objective world truth accruing within the transition from the limited cognitional interest of the practical actuality of life to the purely theoretical interest of the philosopher, and of course [the cognitional goal] of a final, **rationally** to be shaped [world truth]? In how far can a philosophy, a cognition of the world in final truth, be a rational, that is, a practical goal for the single one or for the community of researchers?[[14]](#footnote-14) In how far can in the personal change of single researchers (in a kind of “organic” metabolism) the constantly obtained community of researchers for example, continuously living “*in infinitum”*, have a rational **[701]** goal in science – *in infinitum*? In how far <may> a “truth” directed towards the idea of the object be shaped in such a way, that it never is a final truth itself (since it always retains this mere “relativity” we have talked about as being derived from experience), but which could be accepted as an estimate and an ever better approach towards the ideal goal of the infinity, of eternity, so that the researchers’ work of every generation delivered the total estimate of such a kind that within the progress of the generations the total estimates implied an approximate increasing and in necessity, and the researching life proceeded in continuous movement towards the poles of eternity?[[15]](#footnote-15) And should the whole form of this movement, the whole set of methods, the structure of all such estimates in itself and its build up upon each other should imply an eternity, a finality? The eternal pole thus was not mistaken insofar as it designated continuously, although unattainably, the firm direction of the cognitional course, and thus according to cognized being as according to the theoretical objective truth (the predicative one), as the pole of which then the final “philosophy” would need to be accepted.[[16]](#footnote-16)

And the progress towards the final philosophy was itself a final truth and a practically to be attained one within the true preliminary stages, with the relatively valid philosophies of the estimates. True and genuine philosophy thus would get a double meaning: 1) of the *philosophia perennis* within the endless and as idea; and 2) of the philosophy as “genuine” formation by researchers, which is able to show its genuineness as a member of the progress, for what the progress itself could be seen as such as firm διάθεσις of the performances to the final idea. Nay, the concept of the *philosophia perennis* would itself also gain this sense of an eternal and in itself complete movement towards the final idea, which previously had been called “*philosophia perennis*” in another sense. This may also be designated an idea, but as an ideal which simply as ideal implies an attainability in the same sense like any satisfying practice.

**[702]**

Appendix LV

<Relative truths of the practice – irrelative truths of the theoretical striving for cognition>[[17]](#footnote-17)

The thing in itself as a correlate of the theoretical interest: as interest simply in it itself, irrespective of a special interest coming into relative vicinity of a relative optimum, possibly fulfilling itself therein. It is presupposed that the experience is a normal one, that the experiential object thus <is> related to the normally functioning perceptional bodiliness and to the normality of the experiencing subjectivity as such.[[18]](#footnote-18) Within the experience the thing finds itself in any causal circumstances and is related to them for the practical interest. A certain but quite different normality plays a role there within life. The field as object of the practical interest for example determines itself as a field in normal daylight. But not a certain form is presupposed here *a priori* as under the title “normality”. It is normal that the causal circumstances remain relatively constant in a certain way in unchanging and changing, in the way of the corresponding and to be expected [change] of the object itself. It is presupposed that a landslide does not bury the field, that any extraordinary circumstances of causal intervention abnormally change the object for the interest. If the object is normally cognized in its relation then due to experience an abnormal change can be brought to cognizance. That which has to be accepted as normal circumstance there can sufficiently be cognized within experience; one thus knows what experience is under normal circumstances and as what the thing itself then needs to be determined. One gains a corresponding true being which, while retaining of the normal circumstances – convincing itself of it -, can ever again verify itself in its truth. “How far” one has to proceed in an experiencing way is of course predelineated. In this way any **relative true thing** is determinable, the true thing of any possible interest.[[19]](#footnote-19) Each has its **relative finality**, its experiential method of approaching, its predelineated close sphere in which the anticipated optimum actually needs to be found and needs to show itself. The true being is decided in advance, something always attainable, and in spite of all being unknown determined as something cognizable.

If we now consider the iteration of the approaching as idealized and objectivated; if we leave aside the randomly changing interests and take the ideal continuity of the close spheres and the ideal possibility of ever new reaching outside into the distance, changing the distant in something close and the close thing into something ever closer *in infinitum*; if we take the system of allround close consideration for each close sphere and the close thing in its completeness as something relative true with relation to its causal close circumstances. Each close thing itself can then be thought of as a goal of knowledge, each <as> being itself determined in advance by way of the sensuous structure of the experience, for each valid truth belonging to it. We then have an endless gradual progress of relative truths for something relatively being in such a way that something identical goes through it as the same which determines itself ever anew in every new closeness in relative closeness in relative truth determines itself exactly thus and not otherwise as some relative “in-itself” for this closeness. – But, this being presupposed, can it already be seen that a truth in itself must exist, being methodically cognizable above all these relativities, an irrelative one, from respectively actually to be produced relative truths, and furthermore in such a way that each generally existing relative truth as approximation of the irrelative truth is presentable and constructible in advance?

1. Winter term 1924/25. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. „perceptional judgment“. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Thus it is, and obviously it is inconceivable otherwise. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Possibility of the originally experiencing cognition of objective changes. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. This holds true for my experiencing and prior to the question of the possibility, that my experiential judgments and those of others coincide. But within the same object, even if it was provided <that it actually is the same>, for the intersubjectivity the difficulty was the same. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Like e.g. in every lawsuit. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Practically established world. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The identical within the change of practical interests – the identical „object“. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The identical as goal. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. The theoretical interest = purely objective interest. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. But if each valuation presupposes a substrate-meaning and a meant substrate, what does the „theoretical“ valuing presuppose? It simply does not presuppose anything, it is the valuing and striving which is not based upon a meaning, but is the form of striving of an **absolute meaning**. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. The interest, directed towards the „object“, < the> thing as object, is valuing and practical, but directed towards an absolute self-having, towards that of the self which needs to be grasped, which is meant in all opinions, in all those opinions the judging meaning presupposes. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Nay, but the problem must not be overlooked here: We have an infinity of relative truths, which we do have as actual only within actual experience, each experiencing towards a close thing – in the best case (it does not happen without idealization). But is an irrelative truth in itself needed therefore as a rational cognitional goal, with which in advance we had all these relative truths in our pocket, constructible as approximations? [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. This implies the relation to each possible life’s purpose of the single subjects and communities, since with progressive cognizance of the world ever new possible values and purposes may light up. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Thereby life itself gets ever more rich with attainable values; ever new values can become purposes, and effect satisfactions within education. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Philosophy of the world as universal matter. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Possibly winter term 1924/25. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Thereby the **kinesthetic normality** has a special constitutive function. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Thereby the intersubjective objectivity needs to be secured. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)